













The objective of this paper is not to review the pros and cons of deposit insurance 
systems, but to focus, rather narrowly, on the recent adoption of a deposit insurance 
system (DIS) in Russia, the rationale offered, and the potential impact it might have on 
the stability and development of the Russian banking system. An attempt will be made to 
draw some lessons from the implementation experience in Russia. The paper starts with a 
brief description of the Russian DIS, followed by an overview of the banking system’s 
structure and some observations on the sequencing followed for adopting the DIS and the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The adoption by the Russian Federation of a deposit insurance system (DIS) in late 2003 
was a significant development, although certainly not a novelty by international 
standards.
2 The discussion of the proposal in Parliament took quite some time because it 
was not seen initially as a priority issue and, possibly, due to the resistance from industry 
groups well represented in Parliament. The government did not press either because it 
feared assuming the contingent liabilities resulting from the introduction of the deposit 
insurance scheme. Additional concerns included the intrinsic difficulties of setting up a 
new agency and its insurance fund, taking away functions initially vested in the Central 
Bank of Russia, the opposition of commercial banks to the new insurance fee, and the 
opposition of some vested interests, including the public banks and particularly 
Sberbank—which until a few years ago had almost a complete monopoly of retail 
deposits in Russia.  
 
The arguments offered in defense of the DIS focused on (i) greater public confidence in 
financial institutions and the potentially positive impact on the country’s financial and 
macroeconomic stability; (ii) the need to protect small depositors; and (iii) the benefits of 
leveling the playing field between the different classes of banks, particularly private and 
public, thereby bolstering competition in the financial sector. Especially the small 
Russian regional banks, it was then argued, needed to strengthen their competitive 
position given their perceived importance in improving access to finance and financial 
deepening. 
 
Aside from the real or perceived benefits of a deposit insurance system, there has been 
increasing awareness of its direct and indirect costs, including moral hazard and the 
potential destabilizing effects resulting from a change in incentives on the risk-appetite 
faced by shareholders, bankers, depositors, and other creditors. In addition, the adoption 
of a DIS also has potential implications for the conduct of monetary policy and the design 
of other institutional mechanisms, in particular the central bank’s lender of last resort 
facilities, as well as its impact on the risks faced by it as supervisory agency. The DIS 
may allow banks to substitute deposit insurance for capital or, put in a different form, 
take more risks for the same level of capital.
3 The objective of this paper is not to review 
the pros and cons of deposit insurance systems, but to focus, rather narrowly, on the 
recent adoption of the DIS in Russia, the rationale offered, and the potential impact it 
might have on the stability and development of the Russian banking system. An attempt 
will be made to draw some lessons from the implementation experience in Russia. The 
paper starts with a brief description of the Russian DIS, followed by an overview of the 
banking system’s structure and some observations on the sequencing followed for 
adopting the DIS and the political economy of its adoption. It closes with a discussion of 
areas requiring attention going forward. 
 
                                                 
2 The first formal system was established in 1829 by commercial banks in the State of New York, 
followed—almost a century later—by the first nationwide deposit insurance system in Czechoslovakia in 
1924. See FDIC (1998). 
3 See Demigurc / Kane (2001).   3
II. THE RUSSIAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
1) Legal Framework and Structural Design  
The compulsory Russian deposit insurance system was established by the Federal Law 
Nr. 177-FZ of December 23, 2003.
4  The stated objectives of the law are threefold: (i) 
protecting the rights and legal interests of depositors, (ii) strengthening public confidence 
in the Russian Federation’s banking system, and (iii) re-intermediating savings by the 
population into the domestic banking system. Another objective of the law, albeit not 
explicitly mentioned, is the need to enhance competition by creating a level playing field 
between state-owned banks and private-sector credit institutions.  
 
The Russian Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was created in January 2004 as an 
independent entity headquartered in Moscow and governed by a thirteen-member Board 
of Directors, consisting of 7 government representatives, 5 officials from the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR), and a Director General elected by the Board at the request of the 
Government. The primary responsibilities of the DIA include determining the deposit 
insurance premium, receiving payments from registered banks, making pay-outs to 
depositors in case of bank failures, and managing the Deposit Insurance Fund. Through 
the amendment of the Law "On insolvency (bankruptcy) of credit institutions" in late 
2004, the Russian DIA is now also responsible for administering bankruptcy proceedings 
to liquidate insolvent banks.  
 
Administration: Claims on insured deposits are to be paid by the DIA within three days 
of the date of a depositor submitting all required documentation. A delay in reimbursing 
depositors is penalized by accruing interest at the refinancing rate established by the 
CBR.  
 
Financing: The DIA started its activities with an initial capital endowment of two billion 
ruble, provided by the Russian Government. This amount corresponds to about 0.09 
percent of the deposit base as of July 2005. An additional one billion rubles was provided 
to cover the administrative expenses of the Agency in the start-up phase until premium 
income becomes sufficient. Further state support can be provided if required. Insurance 
premiums are uniform for all banks, payable in rubles on a quarterly basis, and assessed 
on daily averages of insured deposits. The insurance premium cannot exceed 0.15 percent 
of deposits in the last accounting period (Art. 36). The law stipulates that this premium is 
due to fall to 0.05 percent once the fund has accumulated the equivalent of 5 percent of 
the deposit base. The assets collected by the insurance fund can be invested in 
government paper, bonds, equities of Russian issuers, as well as securities of member 
states of the OECD. 
 
Coverage: Deposits are covered in full up to 100,000 RUR (about US$3,500, without 
indexation of the nominal ruble amount). The DIS covers the net liability of the bank 
with the depositor (i.e., netting out outstanding obligations of the depositor with the failed 
                                                 
4 The law took more than a decade to be approved by the Duma. The law was enacted with 5 other pieces 
of legislation, which amended the central bank law, the tax code, the banking law, and other existing laws 
affected by the new deposit insurance scheme. See Tompson (2004), p. 26.    4
bank)
5. Foreign currency-denominated deposits are covered (up to 100,000 RUR 
equivalent), payable in rubles, and converted at the foreign exchange rate determined by 
the CBR. An important caveat is that the state-owned Sberbank, by far the largest 
Russian retail bank, did not participate in the DIS from its inception but will join it 
starting January 1, 2007. 
 
Participation: The design adopted makes the DIS compulsory and automatic (i.e., 
without a legal formality) for all “natural persons’ deposits” (excluding corporate 
deposits, bearer deposits, trust deposits, and offshore deposits in Russian banks).  
 
Overall, the structural framework provided by the Russian deposit insurance law reflects 
in many respects good practices from international experience. The system has clearly 
been designed to cover only healthy institutions, while encouraging weak ones to exit the 
market. The coverage is extensive, but low enough to minimize moral hazard problems 
with participating banks. Participation is compulsory, which in turns should help prevent 
the adverse selection problems often affecting voluntary schemes. The ex-ante guarantee, 
together with the commitment for ex-post state support also could, in principle, be 
powerful confidence-building instruments in the volatile Russian environment.
6 The 
remainder of the paper will focus on analyzing how effective the new system has been so 
far, and which issues still need to be addressed. 
 
2) Implementation Status and Recent Market Trends 
At the end of 2005, the Russian DIS covered about 98.5 percent of the deposit accounts 
held by insured banks and 36 percent of the nominal value of total deposits.
7 The latter 
figure reflects the high concentration of individual deposits as well as the exclusion of all 
corporate deposits. A total of 870 out of the 1,097 banks collecting private deposits 
participate in the DIS, covering 99.2 percent of banking assets. Overall, 1,150 banks filed 
for licensing under the new law, out of which 824 banks were accepted to participate in 
the system in a first round of evaluations conducted by the CBR in its capacity as 
supervisory agency. Four banks withdrew their applications, and a few institutions lost 
their license to take deposits.
 Using the appeal procedure provided by the law, 265 banks 
resubmitted their applications to the DIS. As of January 2006, 931 banks have been 
admitted to the DIS. Yet, it appears that those banks not accepted into the DIS are still 
being allowed to continue taking private deposits until further notice.  
 
The size of the deposit insurance fund increased rapidly to 16.6 bn. RUR (see Fig. 1), 
which represents about 0.6 percent of the individual deposit base. Of this amount, 
insurance premiums paid by participating banks amounted to 9.8 bn. RUR or 59 percent. 
The remainder of the funds consisted of contributions from the Russian Federation (6.1 
bn. RUR or 36.7 percent), and the investment income of the Deposit Insurance Agency 
(0.7 bn. RUR or 4.2 percent).
8  
                                                 
5 Debt offsets can be refinanced with a repayment period for a term of up to six months. 
6 See Tompson (2004), p. 27 for a detailed discussion of this issue.  
7 See DIA website / 2005 DIA Annual Report. In contrast, the total volume of deposits under RUR 
100,000.- as of 1 July 2005 was equal to 39.1% of total deposits.   
8 DIA website, 2005 DIA Annual Report, http://www.asv.org.ru/en/dia/reports/2005/   5
































2 0 0 02 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 32 0 0 42 0 0 5
Deposits of individuals In Roubles Deposits of individuals In foreign currency





Private deposits have grown strongly since the introduction of the DIS, but interestingly, 
at a lower rate than in previous years (see Fig. 2). Individual retail deposits grew faster in 
the regions outside Moscow, especially in the Urals, Volga, and the Russian Far East. 
Most of this growth seems to be driven by deposits collected by branches of credit 
institutions headquartered in Moscow, but it also reflects the emergence of healthy and 
dynamic regional banks. Since the introduction of the DIS, ruble deposits grew faster 
than deposits in foreign currency, coinciding with the rapid real appreciation of the ruble 
vis-à-vis foreign currencies. With the notable exception of foreign banks, most of the   6
growth in deposits took place via term deposits with maturities between 181 days and 3 
years. However, changes in the composition of deposits from sight to term deposits, for 
example, is less significant in Russia than in other countries because retail deposits can 
be withdrawn on demand regardless of their contractual maturity. The latter might 
created unexpected liquidity problems for banks, and it brings a generalized uncertainty 
of duration gaps at a time when the demand for longer-term funding from consumers and 
enterprises is on the rise. 
 
Sberbank’s market share of retail deposits continued to slide down. Interestingly, so did 
the combined market share of the 30 largest Russian banks (see Annex). This seems to 
indicate increasing competition for retail deposits in the banking sector. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that foreign banks in particular have stepped up their acquisition 
efforts. Overall, the banking sector increased its reliance on deposits as a source of 
funding. The share of deposits among bank liabilities increased from 44.4 percent to 58.5 
percent between 2004 and 2005. Yet, real interest rates on deposits still remain negative 
for all maturities (see annex). Interest rates spreads have also not changed significantly 
since 2003 (see fig. 4).
9  
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9 The interest rates shown below are weighted averages based on the volume of deposits by type of 
instruments.   7
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III. MARKET STRUCTURE MATTERS 
As shown in table 1 below, the Russian banking system still seems both highly 
concentrated at the top and very fragmented in the middle and bottom, as well as mainly 
centered in the wealthier Moscow–St. Petersburg corridor. The structure of the banking 
industry offers great potential for further consolidation, in spite of the enormous land 
mass of the Russian Federation. This structure is a legacy of both the socialist past—with 
its large publicly-owned banks—while the fragmentation in the medium and small bank 
sizes reflects the lax entry policies followed in the early 1990s by the CBR in granting 
banking licenses, as well as CBR’s reluctance to force exits or consolidations by using 
stricter regulatory standards and higher capital requirements.
10 Yet, the number of 
deposit-taking banks decreased from 1,239 in 2001 to 1,045 by January 1, 2006. This was 
partly due to mergers and acquisition activities, which have recently picked up and are 
likely to accelerate. 
 
In spite of the large number of institutions, only a small fraction of Russian banks can be 
considered true financial intermediaries with stable franchises. Many of the country’s 
banks are tiny, with over 80 percent of Russian banks operating with capital of less than 
US$10 million
11. Many smaller banks are so-called “pocket banks,” serving a single 
company or its controlling financial–industrial group.
12 The five largest banks accounted 
for 45.1 percent of total bank assets as of early 2005, whereas the top 200 banking 
institutions represented jointly 89 percent of total assets. Although the majority of banks 
                                                 
10 Moody’s Investors Service, “Russia”, Banking System Outlook, October, 2005.  
11 Standard & Poor’s, “The Russian Federation”, Bank Industry Risk Analysis, June 28, 2005. 
12 According to the OECD, a number of these “dwarf” banks are used by their owners for “tax 
optimization” or money laundering. See OECD (2004), p. 5.   8
are privately owned, the state-owned banks control more than 50 percent of banking 
assets.  
 
Table 1:  Overview of recent financial sector evolution in Russia 
   Jan-01  Jan-02  Jan-03  Jan-04  Jan-05  Jan-06 
Number of Institutions                  
           
TOTAL 1311 1319 1329 1329  1299  1253 
Banks  1,274 1,271 1,276 1,277   1,249   1,205 
of which licensed to take deposits  1239  1223  1202  1190  1,165   1,045 
Non-Bank Credit Institutions  37  48  53  52   50   48 
State Banks  -  -  -  20   21   - 
100 percent Foreign Banks          22       23      27 32       33   41 
Moscow Banks (City and Region)  628  639  663  679   671   646 
Regional Credit Institutions  683  680  666  662   628   607 
           
Branch Statistics                  
          
TOTAL # of Branches  3,793 3,433 3,326 3,219    3,238   3,295 
Sberbank 1529 1233 1162 1045  1011  1009 
# of branches outside of Moscow    3,430 3,113 3,023 2,927    2,956   3,003 
Branches per institution  2.9 2.6 2.5 2.4    2.5    2.6 
Population per Branch  -  - - - -  43,642
                   
Other Indicators (in%)                  
                   
M2/GDP  21.1 23.2 25.8 29.8    31.0    33.33 
Banking sector assets / GDP  -  35.3 38.3 42.3  42.0  45.0 
Domestic Credit / GDP  24.1 24.9 26.3 26.6    21.4    20.6 
Credit to domestic real sector / GDP**       11.6  14.8 16.6 20.3  22.9  25.2 
Deposits / GDP  17.2 19.2 21.2 21.9  23.3  26.3 
Household deposits / GDP  -  7.6 9.5 11.5  11.7  12.7 
Source: CBR, IMF 
*) annualized figure 
**) this indicator has undergone major updating throughout 2002-2005 based on the 2005 CBR report  
 
Sberbank is still by far the largest institution, with 54.1 percent of total retail deposits and 
about one-third of total loans outstanding. The remaining 20 state banks are much smaller 
and usually specialize in a particular market niche or region. The only exception is 
Vneshtorgbank, which accounts for about 6 percent of total bank assets. Nonetheless, the 
weight and preferences enjoyed by publicly-owned banks are holding back the 
development of private sector banking in Russia. Banks under foreign control have 
grown substantially in recent years, but they represent only 7.6 percent of total bank 
assets. Although the interest of the latter to enter the booming Russian economy has 
increased, they fear the existing legal uncertainty and claim to face significant informal 
barriers to their operation and expansion.  
 
Overall, the level of penetration of banking services is low, and competition is insular. 
Banking institutions, in general, offer three kinds of services: depository, lending, and   9
transfer services. In all three areas, Russian banks have a long way to go. With a branch 
serving 43,642 persons on average, the level of development of Russian banks’ branch 
networks is far below that of its OECD peers (e.g., 1,555 for France; 2,763 for the US; 
9,992 for Brazil) and other transition economies (e.g., 8,718 for Hungary).
13 In Moscow, 
this average decreases to about 29,631 people per branch. The average individual deposit 
amounts to RUR 6,827, and total bank deposits represent less than 26.3 percent
14 of GDP, 
in contrast to 46.6 percent in Hungary and 79.9 percent in the Czech Republic. Only an 
average of 23 percent of the population has a bank account.  
 
Such lack of development of the domestic financial sector is reflected in the total loans-
to-GDP ratio of just 29 percent, as well as significant borrowing abroad by large Russian 
companies (reported at $19 billion), while domestic banks’ funding of investment is 
estimated at a low 7 percent.
15 Total bank assets amounted to only 42.5 percent of GDP 
as of year-end 2004, compared to an EU average of 280 percent. Yet, this number is the 
result of the financial sector’s impressive growth since the transition to a market 
economy began, with a major disruption resulting from the 1998 crisis and some 
turbulence in the summer of 2004. One result of this low penetration rate is that only a 
limited number of institutions are involved in head-to-head competition for client 
deposits. Most Russian banks have either a limited geographical focus or are specializing 
in a niche client base. The same is true for foreign-controlled banks, which have been 
mainly active in the securities market and a few “blue chip” companies, and are only now 
venturing into consumer lending, which is growing at an exponential rate (270 percent 
growth since 2004).  
 
While public oversight is improving, a high percentage of Russian banks are also weak 
by international standards and potentially vulnerable. In a recent report, Fitch Ratings 
assessed most of Russia’s 30 largest banks as weak. Another rating agency (S&P) 
considers the Russian banking system “to be one of the world’s riskiest from a credit 
perspective.” Given the poor accounting practices and their relative lack of transparency, 
smaller institutions are believed to be in an even more precarious state. Poor governance, 
lack of business diversification, portfolio concentration (partly due to related party 
lending), volatile and concentrated deposits, and poor loan quality are considered to be 
the primary sources of risks. Such weaknesses are somewhat mitigated by strong 
economic growth, a reduction in the underground economy, and rapid asset growth, 
particularly consumer lending. As shown in Table 2 below, the rapid growth of the 
banks’ loan portfolios in recent years (e.g., 44 percent in 2004 and 37 percent in 2005) 
should be monitored as it may expose systemic vulnerabilities in the months ahead. 
 
According to CBR statistics, the quality of the banks’ loan portfolios is low, with loans 
classified as “standard” accounting for a mere 48.2 percent of the total outstanding loan 
                                                 
13 These figures were calculated based on the information provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements [Statistics on payment and settlement systems in selected countries - Figures for 2004 - 
Preliminary version], by the European Central Bank (2005), the Central Bank of Brazil, and various 
internet resources for population data. 
14 This is as of January 2006. 
15 Moody’s, Banking System Outlook, October, 2005.   10
portfolio, compared to 90.7 percent two years earlier.
16 Obviously, these figures reported 
by the Central Bank must be used with caution in view of the adoption in mid-2004 of a 
new loan classification system, which for the first time introduces “the principles of 
estimated recoverable amount on loans and qualitative judgments on borrowers’ 
creditworthiness”.
17 Still, shortcomings with the quality of Russian banks’ loan portfolio 
are undeniable especially when the reported level of non-performing loan figures is 
contrasted with loan loss reserves of only 5 percent (see table 2). Doubtful and 
irrecoverable loans of 1.2 percent of the aggregate loan portfolio, as reported at year-end 
2005, are also very likely to be seriously underestimated. All this combined with large 
credit risks
18 -- still amounting to about 70 percent of the aggregate loan portfolio -- 
illustrate well the challenges currently faced by Russian regulators. 
 
 
Table 2: Selected soundness indicators for Russian banks 
   Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05  Jan-06
Large credit risks (bn. RUR)  1328.9 1964.4 2298.2  2978.1 
in % of outstanding portfolio to real sector 80.3  82.4  70.3  69.7 
in % of equity 272.7  241.1  242.8  239.8 
% Standard Loans  -  90.7 46.9  48.2 
           
Loan Loss Provisions, in % of outstanding 
portfolio -  5.90 5.3  5.0 
           
Outstanding loans with real sector (bn. RUR)  1,654 2,385 3,268.7 4,274.8
growth rate (%)    44 37  31 
Total equity of Banking sector  581.3 814.9 946.6  1,241.8
Source: CBR Banking Supervision report 2005, 2004 and 2003 
 
In an environment like the one described above, deposit insurance can not, by itself, be a 
panacea and stimulate savings in the domestic banking system. Given the increasing 
monetization and rapid growth of the Russian economy, financial sector assets are 
expected to continue growing as they have since the transition began—in spite of the 
economic crises of 1998 and to a lesser extent 2004, as well as the strong decrease in real 
interest rates observed since 2000. As the deposit base grows, the rate of growth of 
deposits will moderate, and in fact has halved since the introduction of the deposit 
insurance system. With the overwhelming share of retail deposits held by public banks, 
mainly Sberbank, an implicit state-sponsored insurance guarantee was already in place, 
creating a market advantage for Sberbank (i.e., flight to “quality” of cheaper funds). 
                                                 
16 Although the underlying trend may be clearly be towards a deterioration of credit quality, this apparent 
surge in sub-standard loans may also reflect a tightening in loan classification rules by the Central Bank of 
Russia.  
17 The new loan classification system increases the number of categories from four to five, setting a range 
for the loan loss provisions within each category (in parentheses). The 5 risk categories are:  Standard (0 
percent), Watch (1-20 percent), Substandard (21-50 percent), Doubtful (51-100 percent) and Loss (100 
percent). See S&P, Bank Industry Risk Analysis, “The Russian Federation”, June 28, 2005, page 10. 
18 Large credit risks are defined as exposure to a single borrower / group in excess of 5 percent of the 
lender’s capital.   11
None of these market fundamentals are significantly altered by the new deposit insurance 
system, although private bank competitors face now a more leveled “playing field”. 
 
However, given the overall weakness of Russian banks, providing deposit insurance 
under these circumstances could potentially fuel systemic instability. On the one hand, 
selecting a subset of institutions to include under the new insurance system would have a 
strong signaling effect. Applying strict soundness requirements could have led to the 
selection of only a small set of institutions in the volatile Russian environment and the 
exclusion of some larger institutions. The result might have been a systemic run on 
deposits and a payment system crisis. On the other hand, providing insurance to weak 
institutions, which would otherwise not be able to grow, creates moral hazard problems 
of its own. It can lead to increased systemic exposure for these institutions as well as to 




Finally, while it is true that Sberbank has been losing market share in the retail deposit 
market (about 13.5 percentage points between 2001 and 2006)
20, it has been gaining 
rapidly market share on the lending side to almost one third of total bank assets. On the 
other hand, Sberbank’s sheer size in comparison to its private sector competitors would 
have led to a significant subsidy by the Russian state to private banks if Sberbank had 
been included under the new DIS. Its exclusion until 2007 is therefore understandable, 
although it is not clear whether the market structure will have changed significantly by 
then. Even if it had been included from the inception of the DIS, the perception of an 
implicit 100 percent insurance by the state would most likely remain with Sberbank’s 
depositors. The new explicit DIS may help to level the playing field somewhat, but 
expectations in this regard should be guarded. 
 
Similarly, Vneshtorgbank (VTB is Russia’s second largest public bank) has been rapidly 
expanding its market share in deposits from 0.7 percent to 3.2 percent since the 
introduction of the DIS, growing its balance sheet also through the “forced” acquisition 
of Guta bank following the mini-crisis of mid-2004.  
 
 
IV.  SEQUENCING OF THE REFORMS  
Following the “near-death” experience of 1998, Russia’s banking system experienced 
new volatility. The summer 2004 mini-crisis made clear the tentative trust of the 
population in the local banking system. It started in May 2004 with the Russian Central 
Bank’s intervention in Sodbiznesbank, a small bank, whose banking license was 
withdrawn on charges of money laundering because of CBR’s limited range of 
instruments to resolve banks. Shortly afterward, Novocherkassk City Bank, a small 
regional bank, also lost its license due to charges of money laundering and failure to 
                                                 
19  See Kane / Demirguc-Kunt (2001). 
20 See graph in Annex / This much reported decrease in Sberbank’s share of deposits, for instance, seems to 
be more linked to the closing of more than a third of its branches since 2001, rather than to a weakening of 
its market leadership position.    12
comply with prudential regulations. Rumors were circulating of a blacklist of weak banks 
being targeted by the CBR, including even larger institutions, quickly leading to loss of 
confidence by contagion and acute liquidity shortages at a number of banking 
institutions. By June, the interbank market had almost entirely dried-up. A number of 
banks started to have liquidity problems because of increasing withdrawals of deposits. 
On July 6, Guta Bank, then Russia’s 22
nd largest bank, collapsed. As Guta Bank 
depositors started to have problems withdrawing money at ATMs, rumors of an imminent 
crisis at Alfa Bank, Russia’s largest private bank, spread quickly. Within just three days, 




To defuse the crisis, the CBR launched a package of measures: (i) slashing the minimum 
reserve requirement on deposits from 7 percent to 3.5 percent, thereby providing 
additional liquidity to the banking system; (ii) acquiring Guta Bank through a public bank 
(VTB); and (iii) communicating to bank clients the isolated nature of financial problems 
in a few banks, dispelling rumors of systemic problems. On July 10, the Russian Duma 
enacted new emergency legislation providing a state-sponsored blanket guarantee to all 
private depositors up to 100,000 RUR. This guarantee covered deposits at all banks, 
irrespective of whether they qualified for the recently established DIS or not. These two 
measures prevented a further deterioration of the situation, and the panic among 
depositors abated within days. Private deposits in the banking system started to grow 
again shortly after. 
 
What can be learned from this episode? First, it is evident that there is a high level of 
wariness among depositors in Russia, many of whom lost their savings during the 1998 
crisis. Although nobody lost deposits in 2004, a recent survey by VTsIOM indicated that 
70 percent of Russians have not had a savings account in the past eight years, either 
because they had no money or simply because they did not trust the banks.
22 Second, 
although the CBR responded effectively and in a coordinated way with other stakeholders 
in 2004, this episode revealed that the CBR’s ability to resolve banks is limited (lack of 
legal tools), and there are deficiencies and huge risks
23 in enforcing prudential 
regulations.
24 Third, blanket guarantees are often provided by the state to avert a systemic 
crisis (i.e., Mexico in 1995), but they should clearly be only temporary. Although 
dismantling them has proved to be tricky, this was not the case in Russia. Fourth, a DIS 
should ideally only be adopted after the foundations of the banking system are considered 
solid.  
 
In Russia’s case, it would have been advisable to first strengthen the CBR’s monitoring 
and enforcement capabilities before introducing a DIS. In other words, proper sequencing 
is critical to the effectiveness of a deposit insurance system, although “ideal sequencing” 
is often not feasible politically. The strategy adopted to “re-certify” banks willing to 
                                                 
21 Business Week Online, July 26, 2004.  
22 See Faulconbridge (2004) and also Belianin (2005) 
23 As evidenced by the recent tragic events leading to the assassination of Andrei Kozlov , CBR’s First 
Deputy Governor in charge of banking supervision. 
24  See annual supervision report of the CBR.   13
access the new DIS was, in our view, the correct one. However, the real challenge has 
been its execution in view of the ambitious timetable set for the process, CBR’s limited 
capabilities, the information problems faced, and above all, by the limited support offered 
to the CBR for a strict implementation of the strategy. Nonetheless, some market views 
seem to be overly negative, suggesting that due to political pressure, the CBR, by 
accepting an overwhelming majority of banks into the DIS, missed an opportunity to 
create a dual system of banks comprising those acting as deposit-taking banks and others 
more closely resembling non-bank financial companies (bearing in mind that non-
accredited banks will lose their right to take deposits from the population).  
 
Thus the opportunity to begin to seriously tackle the extreme fragmentation of the 
banking system was missed”.
25 Only time will tell the extent of Type I error (rejecting the 
bank solvency hypothesis when it is in fact true) versus Type II error (accepting a false 
hypothesis) in the selection process followed by the CBR. Although we are not faced 
with random samples, it is likely that due to deficiencies in the selection process Type II 
errors will dominate, resulting in too many banks being included in the DIS. These 
decisions are not irreversible, but if problems emerge with the banks accepted into the 
DIS, not only are the costs for the Deposit Insurance Fund likely to be quite high, but also 
there is the risk of discrediting the DIS and eroding the franchise value of being a “good 
bank” in the DIS. 
 
V. THE “POLITICAL ECONOMY” FACTOR 
As Laeven (2004) notes, the introduction and design of a DIS is usually the outcome of a 
complex interplay between various political constituencies and stakeholders with often 
conflicting interests.
26 Politicians and lawmakers acting as agents on behalf of a large 
number of small and dispersed depositors must—even in established democracies—also 
consider in their decision-making the interests of other groups in the electorate. Conflicts 
of interest may arise, sometimes even within the same constituency, and trade-offs have 
to be made. A certain coverage level by the insurance scheme may for instance be 
perceived as optimal by a group of depositors and sub-optimal by another depending on 
their wealth. Some tax payers may be concerned about the costs of the scheme and lobby 
for an entirely private insurance scheme (like in Brazil), whereas bankers may be 
interested in some form of state subsidy. Small or weak banks may be very interested in a 
deposit insurance system, whereas large banks with a clear competitive edge and solid 
standing on the market may not.
27 The level and structure of fees, particularly the 
inclusion of a risk-premium, are also sources of conflict.  
 
Reconciling the divergent interests of these various constituencies can in some cases lead 
to sub-optimal outcomes from a public policy perspective. The fear of another traumatic 
banking crisis among policy makers seems to have led to this outcome in Russia. 
Considering the current weakness of the banking system, it is surprising that over 80 
                                                 
25 Moody’s Investors Service, “Russia”, Banking System Outlook, October, 2005, page 8. 
26 See Laeven (2004), p. 1. 
27 See Laeven (2004) for example of U.S. p. 2 -3   14
percent of all Russian banks have been admitted under the deposit insurance system and 
that the number looks set to grow further. International experience provides ample 
evidence that extending deposit insurance to weak institutions increases moral hazard 
risks, provides cross-subsidies to weaker institutions, and raises contingent fiscal 
liabilities by making institutional failures more likely, as risk-taking appetite increases.
28 
It is therefore not surprising that one of the participating banks was already subject to a 
recent intervention by the CBR. 
 





















































Equally troubling are recent proposals being considered by the Duma to gradually 
increase the coverage ceiling from RUR 100,000 to RUR 300,000 until 2007 and up to 
RUR 600,000 in the mid-term.
29 Interestingly, these efforts are spearheaded by the DIA 
with the objective of raising the coverage levels as percentage of GDP under the Russian 
scheme to international levels and promote more savings. As shown in Figure 6, 98.5 
percent of Russian deposits are currently under the RUR 100,000 limit and therefore 
insured. As mentioned earlier, Russian depositors already have the opportunity to place 
their funds in public banks, in particular Sberbank and Vneschtorgbank, and enjoy 100 
percent coverage of their deposits. It is questionable whether public trust in private banks 
and therefore their attractiveness will improve with higher coverage, given their still 
unresolved institutional problems and the limited enforcement power and capabilities of 
the supervisors.  
 
By increasing the coverage, Russian policy makers will most likely increase the (explicit) 
fiscal contingencies without any major positive impact. Here again, the political economy 
factor appears to be leading to a sub-optimal outcome. As Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
indicate, the multiple principal agent problem also extends to bureaucracies and can lead 
government agencies to seek undesirable outcomes.  
                                                 
28 See Kane / Demirguc-Kunt (2001) 
29 See Financial Izvestia (2005)   15
 
Fig. 6: Proportion of total household deposits in the banks participating in the deposit 










by number of deposits by volume of deposits




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
World Bank research suggests that the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system 
can have a positive impact on financial sector stability and help create a more level 
playing field, but it is not a silver bullet. Deposit insurance should not be considered in 
isolation of other key reforms that must be undertaken to avoid the potentially negative 
effects resulting from the change in incentives that derive from adopting a DIS. The 
Russian experience provides an illustration of these findings. Whereas some immediate 
and possibly temporary benefits can be attributed to the new DIS in terms of containing 
the underlying structural and solvency problems is some deposit-taking institutions, it is 
also potentially costly in terms of significant new fiscal contingencies. There is a window 
of opportunity to strengthen the legal and institutional framework to mitigate the potential 
costs and avoid future instability that could discredit the DIS. Additional policy reforms 
are required, in particular in the following areas: 
 
(a) Enforcing prudential regulation.  The vigorous enforcement of CBR-enhanced 
prudential standards—including the adoption of: stricter fit and proper tests for owners, 
directors and managers of financial institutions, stricter corporate governance rules (see 
below), and timely and more complete disclosure, as well as the adoption of consolidated 
and risk-based supervision and IT audits—and a progressive increase in solvency 
requirements (including minimum capital requirements) are important disciplining 
measures that are critical for the future stability of the Russian banking system. In this 
respect, the current limit of 25 percent of capital established on large exposures is   16
meaningless, and the high loan concentrations and lending to related parties are major 
sources of risk for banks as well as ultimately for the DIS itself. 
 
(b) Reforming the bank resolution system.  Additional reforms are required for the CBR 
to have effective disciplining tools for a quick and orderly exit of nonviable banks. 
Currently, it is very cumbersome to transfer deposits from the failed or distressed bank to 
another bank because prior consent from the depositor is required. This was a problem in 
managing the mini-crisis of 2004. Similarly, the DIA is not allowed to assume losses 
directly or through the purchase of bad loans in the event of bank rescue operations (i.e., 
acquire non-performing loans with assessed values lower than the nominal value of the 
deposits). It also cannot provide open bank assistance to banks that might fail (i.e., banks 
that have a solvency problem but are not eligible to access the liquidity window of the 
CBR). This is important because experience has shown that bank liquidations are often 
more costly than the cost of using other support mechanisms. Further, the DIA cannot 
securitize loans in support of bank resolutions or exclude on its own a bank from the DIS. 
It is only when the CBR withdraws the banking license that the bank is formally dealt 
with by the DIA. Nor can the DIA initiate a bank inspection, or request a special audit of 
a bank or its controlling group. The latter are faculties of the CBR as supervisor. 
 
(c) Consolidating the banking sector.  Given the weakness of many banks in the system, 
Russian authorities may want to more aggressively promote mergers, acquisitions, and 
orderly market exits in the banking sector. The recent rapid growth of banks’ loans 
should be expected to make the bank recapitalization model of the past—consisting 
basically of increasing bank capital via retained earnings—more difficult to sustain. Asset 
growth is now clearly outpacing the increase in banks’ capacity to generate new capital 
internally. In addition to increasing difficulties to meet capital adequacy requirements, 
private local banks might be put at a severe disadvantage compared to state-owned banks 
and foreign banks. However, they may be able to broaden their capital base and reap 
synergies through mergers, and possibly even achieve new capital injections in the 
process. Such partnerships and mergers should ideally also involve the participation of 
reputable foreign banks.  
 
(d) Reforming the contracting environment.  Reforms are needed to reduce prevailing 
legal uncertainties in the safe and sound operation of financial intermediaries, including 
revising secure lending legislation, strengthening the bankruptcy regime, and improving 
the fairness and effectiveness of commercial courts. Similarly, it will be important to 
differentiate and enforce an adequate time structure of liabilities. Retail deposits can 
currently be withdrawn any time regardless of their actual contractual maturity, with little 
or no penalty. This implies significant liquidity risks for banks, as all their liabilities are 
de facto on demand. A system of penalties for early withdrawal is important to reduce the 
liquidity risks faced by Russian banks today.
30  
 
                                                 
30 Another significant source of liquidity risk is the high concentration of bank deposits in a few companies 
or wealthy individuals as indicated by Fig. 8. Consolidation in the banking sector could help address this 
problem.   17
(e) Reforming corporate governance and the corporate sector.  The issue of corporate 
governance in banks and corporations is of paramount importance. Without clarity of 
ownership, responsibilities, and accountabilities, basic requirements for the safe operation 
of banks, like effective internal control systems, are not credible. Given the prevalence of 
financial–industrial groups (FIGs), further progress in the Russian banking system must 
also be accompanied by changes in the corporate sector towards better definition of inter-
company structures, with well-defined holding company structures, better corporate and 
bank governance, and increased transparency. In the meantime, the risks taken by the DIS 
could be largely unknown and quite likely higher than those that it would assume in an 
environment of more transparent legal and organizational arrangements. 
 
(f) Reforming and eventually privatizing state-owned banks.  Finally, there is the major 
issue of the public banking system, in particular the role of Sberbank. There is no doubt 
that the market share and privileged position of these banks distort financial sector 
development, at least in urban markets where they are competing with a significant 
number of private banks. Yet, at the same time, a big-bang privatization of this sector 
may lead to a substantial level of financial disintermediation in the short to medium term, 
and it is politically unfeasible under the current circumstances.
31 A gradual approach is 
required. In the short term, the focus should be on minimizing duplications and 
inefficiencies in the operation of these banks (e.g., Sberbank competing with 
Vneschtorgbank), limiting their growth in areas with a strong influx of private banks, 
transparency on the explicit and implicit subsidies provided to them, and introducing a 
hard-budget constraint for their fiscal impact. The limited guarantee provided under the 
explicit deposit insurance system will have, at best, only a marginal impact on this 
situation.  
 
(g) Other reforms: insurance pricing.  At the more micro level, Russian policy makers 
also need to address the design of the deposit insurance system itself. For instance, there 
is a need to review the approach selected for setting the insurance premium. The 
premium by law must be uniform for all banks, irrespective of their level of risk, which 
implies a subsidy of the stronger to the weakest banks, with a “welfare loss” from an 
economic perspective. From our perspective, a much preferable option would include, ex-
post and confidential, rebates on banks’ deposit insurance fees paid to the DIF, reflecting 
lower effective payments for better managed and financially stronger institutions (as 
measured by CAMEL-type indicators). In this way, incentives of banks, insurers and 
supervisors would be aligned, avoiding the negative signaling effect (which might 
precipitate deposit runs) of differential, ex-ante, deposit insurance fees for different types 
of banks. 
 
(h) Insurance Fund.  A related issue is the actuarial soundness of the funds given the 
current level of the premium.
32 Without an adequately capitalized insurance scheme, the 
likelihood of a future need for a state bail-out will remain substantial. Furthermore, a 
strategy must be designed for phasing out the blanket guarantee provided by the Russian 
                                                 
31 Russia is by no means unique in this situation. Western European countries such as Germany and France 
also display similar levels of public participation in their financial system.  
32 See Laeven (2002) for a discussion of this issue.   18
state in the wake of the 2004 mini-crisis. This blanket guarantee is due to expire at the 
end of 2006, and an orderly process to prepare for this event is important.
33 Otherwise, 
the elimination of the blanket guarantee could lead to more turbulence on the Russian 
banking market with substantial operational implications for the DIA (i.e., liquidation of 
institutions and a surge in insurance claims). Finally, Russian authorities are well advised 
to complement the current deposit insurance system with an ambitious financial 
education and communication initiative. According to an Izvestiia survey in March 2005, 
only 30 percent of respondents were aware of the existence of the DIS.
34 There is little 
evidence indicating that this figure has changed substantially. 
                                                 
33 See IMF (2004), p. 54. 
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Fig. A.3 








































Tril.  Dynamics of attracted household deposits by the banks 
 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average < 30 days 31 - 90 days 91 - 180 days 181 days - 1 year > 1 year
 
Source: Staff calculations based on CBR data 
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Fig. A.5 
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